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Municipalities' Right to Full Compensation




The preceding issue of the Dickinson Law Review carries an article
by Gardner Gillespie, Rights-of-Way Redux: Municipal Fees on
Telecommunications Companies and Cable Operators, on the hotly
contested question of the amounts that local governments may charge
telecommunications providers for use of the public rights-of-way. 1 His
article is constructed around a central premise that local governments
historically have not had the right to recover compensation based on fair
market value (FMV) for telephone companies' use of the public rights-
of-way and that, therefore, section 253 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996,2 which, according to Mr. Gillespie, preempts franchise fees in
excess of cost-recovery, merely restores the status quo ante.3 Both Mr.
Gillespie's historical premise and his reading of section 253 are highly
controversial, and court decisions both accept and reject his contentions.4
Mr. Gillespie concludes his article by observing that "the issues
* Mr. Malone, A.B., Harvard College, J.D., Harvard Law School, is of counsel to
the law firms of Miller & Van Eaton, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., and Miller & Van
Eaton, L.L.C., San Francisco, CA. He practices before the Federal Communications
Commission and has appeared as counsel for local governments in rights-of-way cases in
state and federal courts. Much of the state law research for this article was done by
Laurie Gelman, J.D., The George Washington University School of Law.
1. Gardner F. Gillespie, Rights-of-Way Redux: Municipal Fees on
Telecommunications Companies and Cable Operators, 107 DICK. L. REv. 209 (2002).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2002). The Telecommunications Act added section 253 to the
Communications Act of 1934. See id.
3. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 251.
4. Id. at 211 ("[L]itigation continues to dispense wildly inconsistent judicial
decisions."). Even decisions of a single appellate panel may be disparate. See City of
Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 247 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 260 F.3d 1160 (9th
Cir. 2001) (making eight significant changes through amending order), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1079 (2002).
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surrounding municipal wireline fees are likely to remain on boil until the
judicial decisions reach equipoise, as they largely did a century ago
regarding municipal effort to exact 'pole fees' from telegraph and
telephone companies."5
On the specific question of FMV compensation, the Second Circuit
in T.C.G. New York, Inc. v. City of White Plains6 found the statutory
language of section 253 to be "not dispositive ''7 and, characterizing the
question as a "difficult" one, declined to reach the issue.8 Indeed, of the
Telecommunications Act generally, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court
in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board,9 observed that "[i]t would be a gross
understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity."' 0
Circuit courts have also noted the difficulty of parsing the language of
section 253.11
The purpose of this article is to qualify Mr. Gillespie's historical
premise and to reanalyze the conflicting interpretations of section 253.
This article will generally follow Mr. Gillespie's outline.
II. On Rights of Way Redux: A Critique
A. On the Necessity for Action
Mr. Gillespie states that policy-makers and courts should be
concerned by "fees," "taxes," and "rents" that local governments are
charging wireline telecommunications providers for the providers' use of
local rights-of-way as economic inputs or factors of production for their
profit-making businesses.' 2 He cites a February 2002 resolution by the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) as
evidence of the need for more reasonable rates. 13  Subsequently,
however, in July 2002, NARUC's board of directors refused to endorse
any of the options (including one for cost-based franchise fees) for
accomplishing that end that had been produced by its Rights-of-Way
5. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 250-51.
6. 305 F.3d 67 (2001), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Jan. 10,
2003) (No. 02-1062).
7. Id. at 77.
8. Id. at 79.
9. 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
10. Id. at 397.
11. BellSouth Telecomms. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1187 (i1 th Cir.
2001) (identifying "perceived inconsistencies within the structure of [section 253]"); City
of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting the "oddity of [section
253(a)'s] formulation").
12. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 209-10.
13. Id.at210-11.
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Study Committee.
14
Access to rights-of-way is not high on a competitive local exchange
carrier (CLEC) executive's list of obstacles to deployment of the
carrier's network. Sometimes, in fact, it is not on the list at all.' 5 Rather,
there are other factors to which the present travails of the CLEC industry
can be more readily attributed.
16
B. On the Historical Perspective
The dual theses of Mr. Gillespie's article-that local governments
never had the right to compensation for providers' uses of the public
rights-of-way in their private businesses for profit and that the current
controversy will reach a stasis centered on cost-based fees 7-are
analytically difficult, because there are probably as many lines of legal
authority as there are bodies of property and municipal law in the various
domestic jurisdictions. In many states there are no controlling statutes or
judicial precedents. Leaving Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 8 to one
side, the definition of property rights is quintessentially a state-law
function. Indeed, Mr. Gillespie argues strenuously' 9-in the context of
what he considers the pivotal case of City of St. Louis v. Western Union
Telegraph Co.N2°-that, even in the pre-Erie era of Swift v. Tyson,21 the
United States Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged the controlling
effect of state law when it assumed, in its opinion on rehearing in City of
St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., that Missouri law controlled.22
But certainly, in any event, property rights are uniquely and
quintessentially determined by state law.2 3
14. STUDY COMM. ON PUB. RIGHTS OF WAY, NAT'L Ass'N OF REGULATORY UTIL.
COMM'RS, PROMOTING BROADBAND ACCESS THROUGH PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY AND
PUBLIC LANDS 177 (2002), available at http://www.naruc.org/Committees
/telecom/row.pdf.
15. See JOSEPH S. KRAEMER & RANDOLPH J. MAY, LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPETITION:
PROGRESS IN MARYLAND (Progress & Freedom Found., Progress on Point Release 9.16,
2002), available at http://www.pff.org/Publications/POP9.16MarylandCompetition
Study.pdf.
16. See MARTIN F. MCDERMOTT, CLEC: TELECOM ACT 1996: AN INSIDER'S LOOK
AT THE RISE AND FALL OF LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPETITION 222, 241, 304 (2002); LARRY
F. DARBY, JEFFREY A. EISENACH & JOSEPH S. KRAEMER, THE CLEC EXPERIMENT:
ANATOMY OF A MELTDOWN (Progress & Freedom Found., Progress on Point Release
9.23, 2002), available at http://www.pff.org/Publications/POP9.23CLEC.pdf.
17. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 212.
18. 304 U.S. 64 (1935).
19. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 219-20.
20. 148 U.S. 92, reh'g denied, 149 U.S. 465 (1893).
21. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
22. City of St. Louis, 149 U.S. at 467; see also City of St. Louis, 148 U.S. at 100.
23. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984); Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
2003]
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From this large universe of cases, Mr. Gillespie cites cases
1 4reflecting the law in far fewer than fifty-one jurisdictions. These cases
would not themselves support any conclusion as to the majority rule.
Moreover, the first thing one notices about the statutes and cases
cited by Mr. Gillespie is their age. They wane in frequency very quickly
after 1910.25 There is a historical reason for this. The problem at the
time of the Civil War was bringing telegraph service to remote areas of
the country-connecting the two coasts by something more nearly "real
time" than the Pony Express.26 Congress responded in the railroad acts
of the mid-nineteenth century by requiring the land-grant railroads to
carry public telegraph traffic on the pole lines paralleling their tracks.27
Next, Congress enacted the Post Roads Act of 186628 to give telegraph
companies the authority to run pole lines along postal routes.29 It was on
the basis of the Post Roads Act that Western Union sought judicial relief
from St. Louis's per-pole franchise fee in the City of St. Louis v. Western
Union Telegraph Co. cases,30 to which Mr. Gillespie devotes nearly
seven pages. 31  The Act merely gave Western Union, which was
chartered in New York, the same authority in states other than New York
that the land-grant railroads enjoyed in multiple states by virtue of their
federal charters.32 The Supreme Court unmistakably held that the Post
Roads Act did not carry with it a power to take property-with or
without compensation. 33 Viewed in the context of nineteenth century
corporate law, the Post Roads Act did not address a real estate problem;
it addressed a "foreign" corporation problem-the need to extend
Western Union's charter power pertaining to rights-of-way beyond its
state of incorporation.
34
287, 294 n.5 (1942) ("[T]he state where land is located is 'sole mistress' of its rules of
real property."); Hood v. McGhehee, 237 U.S. 611, 615 (1915).
24. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 1, at 222 n.83.
25. See id.
26. Alexander J. Field, The Regulatory History of a New Technology:
Electromagnetic Telegraphy, 2001 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 245, 245-46
(2001).
27. See Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489.
28. Post Roads Act of 1866, ch. 230, 14 Stat. 22 1, repealed by Act of July 16, 1947,
ch. 256, 61 Stat. 327.
29. Id.
30. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893), reh'g denied, 149
U.S. 465 (1893).
31. See Gillespie, supra note 1, at 217-24.
32. City of St. Louis, 148 U.S. at 101.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 100-01 ("No one would suppose that a franchise from the federal
government to a corporation, state or national, to construct interstate roads or lines of
travel, transportation, or communication, would authorize it to enter upon the private
property of an individual, and appropriate it without compensation."); cf AT&T v. Sec'y
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The dominant public policy issue in the 1880s was getting telephone
service to the people. Many states legislatively offered a quidpro quo to
the telephone companies: the states would give a territorial monopoly to
the companies in return for the companies' commitment to provide
universal service in the service area covered by the certificate of public
convenience and necessity.35
The deals for universal service struck between state legislatures and
private companies were quintessential "regulatory compacts." It is
generally recognized that "[s]tate public utility regulation ... of local
telephony[] represents a contract between the state and the regulated
company., 36 The state's role is that of negotiating and administering a
contract that governs the continuing relationship with the utility on
behalf of its body of customers and of adjusting that contract to changing
situations.37 It is no less a contract because it arises by statute:
In general, a statute is itself treated as a contract when the language
and circumstances evince a legislative intent to create private rights
of a contractual nature enforceable against the State. In addition,
statutes governing the interpretation and enforcement of contracts
may be regarded as forming part of the obligation of contracts made
under their aegis.
38
The concept of public utility regulation as an implied two-party
contract can be found in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court as far
back as Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.39 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Taney framed the issue as whether the subsequent
authorization to construct the Warren Bridge was an impairment of the
obligations of Massachusetts under its contract with the proprietors of the
Charles River Bridge.4°
By the turn of the last century, the concept of public utility
regulation as a regulatory compact was well established:
Franchises are based in this country upon contracts between the
of State, 123 N.W. 568, 568 (Mich. 1909) (denying AT&T, a New York corporation with
the power to provide both telephone and telegraph service, the authority to do business in
Michigan as a foreign corporation because it could qualify in Michigan only under the
1851 telegraph act or under the 1883 telephone act but not under both simultaneously).
35. See generally William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity: Developments in the States, 18 70-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 426 (1979).
36. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 851, 879 (1996).
37. Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON.
426, 427-29 (1976).
38. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977) (citations
omitted).
39. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
40. See id. at 549.
2003]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
sovereign power and a private citizen, made upon a valuable
consideration for purposes of public benefit as well as for individual
advance; and it is said by Chancellor Kent that franchises "contain an
implied covenant on the part of the government not to invade the
rights vested, and on the part of the grantees to execute the conditions
and duties prescribed in the grant."4
One of the key components to such regulatory compacts is the
utility service obligations-that is, the obligation to serve.42  "[I]t is
axiomatic in public utility law that it is the duty of a public utility, in
response to valuable rights and considerations granted to it, to provide
adequate ... service to the public. 43
But a distinguishing feature of regulatory compacts is that they are
modified over time as the situation changes.44 The point here is simply
that the policy decisions in an era in which making telephone services
available in all geographic areas was the dominant policy consideration
centered on the basis of the quidpro quo between the regulators and the
regulatees. So-called "universal service" was certainly a consideration as
late as the enactment of the Communications Act of 1934,45 which
provides for "regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States... a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service.
'A6
Non-federal authority "to preserve and advance universal service" was
expressly preserved more recently in section 253(b) of the Act, added in
1996.47
But the focus of the regulatory quidpro quo shifted in the 1996 Act,
which substituted more explicit subsidies for implicit subsidies of
universal service and the introduction of competition.4 8 The Universal
41. JOSEPH ASBURY JOYCE, A TREATISE ON FRANCHISES 12 (1909); see also Warren
G. Lavey, Making and Keeping Regulatory Promises, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (2002).
42. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 36, at 907; Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas, 262 U.S.
522, 535-36 (1923) (classifying utilities as businesses that "are carried on under the
authority of a public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the
affirmative duty of rendering a public service").
43. Bait. Steam Co., 89 Md. P.S.C. 1 (1998) (quoting Chicago & Northwestern Ry.
Co., 75 Wyo. P.U.R.3d 408, 416 (1968)), rev'd sub nom. Bait. Steam Co. v. Balt. Gas &
Elec. Co., 716 A.2d 1042 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998), vacated, 725 A.2d 549 (Md. 1999).
44. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 427-28.
45. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-573 (2002).
46. Id. § 151.
47. Id. § 253(b).
48. See id. § 214(e) (applying to the provision of universal service); id. § 254
(applying to universal service); PETER H. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE,
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 6.3.3.1 (2d ed. 1999).
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Service Fund, created by section 254 of the Communications Act,4 9 was
intended to bring transparency to the provision of universal service
through patent, rather than latent, monetary subsidies in the high-cost
areas. 50 More importantly, the telephone business, rather than being a
fenced-in natural monopoly, became competitive, so that the
regulators-federal and state-could no longer move subsidies within a
closed system.
Universal service had, in fact, been largely achieved even before the
passage of the 1996 Act.5' No longer was there a need, if there ever had
been, to prompt telephone companies' extension of telephone service by
giving them a "free ride" in the public rights-of-way. Section 254 stands
as evidence that Congress rejected such implicit subsidies in favor of
explicit subsidies. Consistent with that view, telephone companies
competing for profit in a competitive market should no longer expect an
implicit right-of-way subsidy.
In fact, failure of consideration on both sides of the regulatory
compact was built into the 1996 Act. Because of section 253(b),52 not
only were the telephone companies shorn of their monopolies, but the
introduction of competition brought with it the phasing out of the
obligation to serve. For example, Verizon's (then-Bell Atlantic's)
lawyers told a Maryland regulatory commission in 2000 that its
obligation to serve in Maryland's deregulated local service environment
was limited to switched voice.53 Similarly, the FCC provided for ease of
entry and exit for non-dominant carriers.54
In some states the early rights-of-way decisions cited by Mr.
Gillespie were effectively reversed by state legislative action. In
Maryland, for example, the legislature-as part of its reorganization of
the Maryland State Roads Commission--enacted local public laws
explicitly transferring title to roads to a local county.55 In other states it
has always been recognized that municipalities have the rights of
49. 47 U.S.C. § 254.
50. See id.
51. See ALEXANDER BELIFANTE, TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
(Indus. Analysis & Tech. Div., Fed. Communications Comm'n, 2002), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/subsO3O2.
pdf.
52. Section 253(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 253(a), as amended by
the 1996 Act, preempted state certificates of public convenience and necessity that
allocated monopoly territories, and section 10, id. § 160 (applying to competition in
provision of telecommunications service), did likewise with respect to the FCC's
certificates of public convenience and necessity under section 214(a), id. § 214(a).
53. See Letter from Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. to Maryland Public Service
Commission, Office of External Relations (Oct. 4, 2000) (on file with author).
54. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.01, 63.71 (2000).





But there is a far more potent and universal reason why the older
cases are no longer predictive of present-day state law. As the United
States became more urbanized, municipal home rule statutes were
adopted. Typically, these statutes implicitly or explicitly 57 repealed
Dillon's rule,58 on which Mr. Gillespie relies.59 Statutes such as these
represented a watershed, such that pre-home rule cases on municipal
property rights are no longer unconditionally authoritative. 60 Indeed, in
one Indiana case, the court held that Indiana's Home Rule Act of 1980
validated a city's power to charge rent under a 1903 statute that the
company argued had limited municipal franchise fees.6' The statement
that Mr. Gillespie attributes to Judge Dillon62-that municipalities'
property rights rest "entirely upon their charters or the legislative
enactments applicable to them"-is obviously too broad.
63
1. On Municipal Ownership and Control of the Streets
In Part II.A of his article, Mr. Gillespie recites various cases for the
proposition that municipalities do not have the right to charge rent for
private uses of their streets for profit. Again, the authority on which he
relies is largely dated. 64 To the extent that these cases rely on Dillon's
rule, that rule has been effectively repealed in most states by municipal
home rule legislation. 65 Even in states where Dillon's rule remains in
force, it does not apply to municipal "limitations of powers" charters as
56. City of Detroit v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 132 N.W.2d 660, 665 (Mich. 1965)
("These streets and alleys ... the city already owned."); Long v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co.,
227 N.W. 739, 740 (Mich. 1929) (quoting People v. Harris, 67 N.E. 785, 788 (11l. 1903)
("[I]n incorporated cities, the title to the streets is vested in the municipality ... .
57. E.g., IND. CODE § 36-1-3-4 (2002) (repealing Dillon's rule).
58. "Dillon's rule" holds that municipal powers are limited to those powers that are
expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislature and "those [that are] essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply
convenient, but indispensable." JoHN FORREST DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-49 (5th ed. 1911).
59. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 212-13.
60. See City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 2000) ("The
Home Rule Act abrogated the traditional rule .....
61. Id. at 154.
62. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 213 n.16.
63. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Detroit & Howell Plank Road Co., 5 N.W. 275, 280
(Mich. 1880) (stating that cities "are protected by the Constitution in the property they
rightfully acquire for local purposes, and the State cannot despoil them of it"); People v.
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 104-05 (1871) (citing cases for the proposition that the legislature
is not competent to take away the private property of the city).
64. See Gillespie, supra note 1, at 213-15 nn.14-34.
65. 2A SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOvERNMENT LAW § 21.01 (2d
ed. 1998).
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distinguished from municipal "grants of powers" charters. 66 Cases like
United States v. City of New York6 7 are often cited for the proposition
that municipal property is not subject to fair-market valuation upon
condemnation. But that case antedates United States v. 50 Acres of
Land,6 & which holds, to the contrary, that the Fifth Amendment protects
property of local governments on a FMV basis.69
Mr. Gillespie seems to argue that, because in some states streets are
held by municipalities in trust for the public ("publici juris"), those
municipalities are deprived of the ability to charge rent.7 ° Such a result,
of course, would contradict the common principle that a trustee must
manage property held in trust so as to maximize the return. 71 Twenty-six
states have constitutional or statutory provisions (so-called "anti-
donation clauses") limiting the ability to give away public property
without receiving adequate compensation.72
There is a body of law, derived from Justinian, called the "public
trust" doctrine.7 3 In general terms this doctrine, which has recently been
brought back into vogue, provides that property held in trust for the
public cannot be sold or otherwise disposed of. 74  Obviously, such a
66. In re Lincoln Elec. Sys., 655 N.W.2d 363, 374 (Neb. 2003).
67. 168 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1948).
68. 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
69. Id. at 31.
70. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 213.
71. See Daly v. Ga. S. & Fla. R.R. Co., 7 S.E. 146, 150 (Ga. 1888); People ex rel.
Lapice v. Wolper, 183 N.E. 451, 454 (Ill. 1932); Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d
312, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989); Roger D. Colton & Michael F. Sheehan,
Raising Local Government Revenue Through Utility Franchise Charges: If the Fee Fits,
Foot It, 21 URB. LAW. 55, 66 (1989); Jennifer L. Worstell, Note, Section 253 of
Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Permanent Physical Appropriation of Private
Property That Must Be Justly Compensated, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 441,445 (1998).
72. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6; ARIz. CONST. art. IX, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 6; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10; HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 4;
HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-1.5(10) (2002); IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 4; id. art. XII, § 4; ILL.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a); IOWA CODE § 721.2 (2002); Ky. CONST. §§ 6, 177, 179; LA.
CONST. art. VII, § 14(A); MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 34, 54; MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 26;
NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 9; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 5; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 2;
id. art. VIII, § 3, para. 3; N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 8; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 32; OKLA. CONST. art. 10, §§ 15, 17; TEx. CONST. art. 3, §§ 50, 51, 52;
WASH. CONST. art. 8, §§ 5, 7.
73. See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987).
74. See, e.g., Frona M. Powell, The Public Trust Doctrine: Implications for Property
Owners and the Environment, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 255 (1997); Joseph L. Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 471 (1970); Donna Jalbert Patalano, Note, Police Power and the Public Trust:
Prescriptive Zoning Through the Conflation of Two Ancient Doctrines, 28 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 683 (2001); Susan D. Baer, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine-A Tool
To Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of Public Lands and Its
Resources, 15 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 385 (1988).
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proposition, if applied unconditionally to right-of-way franchising,
would prove too much, for it would not permit investor-owned utilities to
obtain usage of public rights-of-way on any basis. A more sensible
application of the public use doctrine, however, would allow disposal of
sticks from the bundle of rights that are not used by or useful to the
public. For example, if the public is using the surface of a road, the
public use should not inhibit the municipal trustee's maximizing the
return to the public through a vertical division of the rights-of-way that
does not impair the public use. 75 This division is sometimes known at
the "public purposes" exception.76
2. On Municipal Regulatory Fees and the Concept of Street
Rentals
In Part II.B of his article, Mr. Gillespie contends that municipal
right-of-way fees are limited to recovery of the municipalities' costs of
regulation.77 His contention, as a general proposition, is subject to many
types of limitations centering on the question of what costs are allowable
under that test. Indeed, that was not seen as much of a limitation at all in
City of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., in which, as Mr.
Gillespie notes in a subsequent section,78 the Court construed the City's
charter power to "regulate ... telegraph companies" as encompassing
"the power to require payment of some reasonable sum... [for use of
the streets to be] within the grant of power to regulate the use.",7 9 In
context, the Court's opinion is not an abandonment of the earlier rent
rationale, as Mr. Gillespie argues in Part II.B, but an affirmation of the
City's power under state law to charge rent.
3. On Municipal Franchise Fees
Mr. Gillespie analyzes "franchise fees" separately from "rents" in
Part II.D of his article. This analysis is not very satisfying and is not a
distinction that is universally accepted. In City of Dallas v. FCC,8 ° the
Fifth Circuit upheld a cable franchise fee on same basis as had the
Supreme Court in City of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
stating that "[f]ranchise fees are not a tax, however, but essentially a
form of rent: the price paid to rent use of public right-of-ways.'
75. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1988).
76. See I11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 466 (1892).
77. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 215-17.
78. Id. Part II.C.
79. City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468-70 (1893).
80. 118 F.3d 393 (1997).
81. Id. at 397.
.632 [Vol. 107:3
MUNICIPALITIES' RIGHT TO FULL COMPENSATION
The conceptual problem with such a separation arises from an
analytical failure to take into account cumulatively the differing
governmental and proprietary bases for franchising. Even within a given
state, courts have not always been able to maintain a consistent
rationale. In some states franchises are denominated "incorporeal
hereditament[s]."83
Part of the seeming confusion results from a failure to differentiate
among four meanings of "franchises": corporate franchises, right-of-way
franchises, business franchises, and franchises based on ownership of
intellectual property, such as trademarks. The corporate franchise gives
legal rights to a non-natural entity-a legal fiction-that would have no
corporate existence or powers in the absence of a grant from the state.
84
The second type of franchise gives legal rights based on control or
ownership of real property.85 The third is an occupational license
founded on the governmental right to exclude from a line of business
under the police power.86 The fourth is founded on the right to exclude
under common or statutory law.87 The common element of these four
usages of "franchise" is that they rest on the exercise of governmental
power, although in the cases of the second and fourth categories the civil
rights cases teach that the courts' vindication of property rights is not
state action.
88
There are conceptual differences among right-of-way
authorizations-franchises, licenses, and permits-that are not material
to this discussion and are often conflated by the courts. 89 The third type
of franchise is conceptually somewhat akin to a royal warrant, although
its modem function partakes more of a tax.90 An obvious difference
between an occupational license and a right-of-way franchise is that the
latter does not extend geographically beyond the metes and bounds of the
82. Compare Vill. of Jonesville v. S. Mich. Tel. Co., 118 N.W. 736, 738 (Mich.
1908) (employing right-of-entry rationale), with City of Lansing v. Mich. Power Co., 150
N.W. 250, 253 (Mich. 1914) (employing easement rationale).
83. Gue v. Tide Water Canal Co., 65 U.S. 257, 263 (1860) (stating that under
Maryland law a franchise is an incorporeal hereditament).
84. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 339 (6th ed. 1990).
85. 36 AM. JUR. 2D Franchises from Public Entities § 1 (1968 & Supp. 2002)
(pertaining to right-of-way franchises).
86. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Private Franchise Contracts § 2 (1990 & Supp. 2002).
(pertaining to business franchises and trademark franchising).
87. See id
88. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (holding that judicial
enforcement of state trespass laws are not state action within meaning of the Civil Rights
Act).
89. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
90. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Private Franchise Contracts § 2 (1990 & Supp. 2002)
(pertaining to business franchises and trademark franchising).
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rights-of-way, while an occupational franchise is geographically bounded
by the jurisdictional boundaries of the governmental unit, irrespective of
ownership of property.
91
4. On Municipal Taxes
In Part II.E, Mr. Gillespie argues that "[s]eldom... can municipal
wireline fees be justified under state law as 'taxes."' ' 92 A state-by-state
analysis would probably show him right in many cases in a literal sense,
save where expressly authorized by statute. However, City of Gary v.
Indiana Bell Telephone Co. 93 is instructive on the degree of care
necessary in sourcing the municipal franchising power. Indiana's home
rule act very carefully limited the City's occupational licensing authority
and its ability to collect non-cost-based franchise fees.94 The trial court
struck down the City franchise fee on the ground that it was not a cost-
based regulatory fee and hence was a "tax" for which authority was
expressly withheld by the home rule act.95 A 3-2 majority of the Indiana
Supreme Court rejected the lower court's invalidation of the fee and
upheld the tax as rent indistinguishable from concession fees charged by
municipal owners of airports.96 The classification of a franchise fee as a
"tax" was similarly rejected under South Carolina law in BellSouth
Telecommunications v. City of Orangeburg.
97
Mr. Gillespie concludes Part II.E by discussing the effect of the Tax
Anti-Injunction Act of 193798 on the enforcement of section 253 in the
federal courts. The point recognized by Judge Edgar in his opinion in
City of Chattanooga v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.99 is that
charges that are not "taxes" under state law may be taxes for the
purposes of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act. 00 If for no other reason than
that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act is jurisdictional, one should not accept
without qualification Mr. Gillespie's statement: "Where the issue
involves an unlawful denial of access to the rights-of-way, the Tax
Injunction Act should not preclude the exercise of federal
91. See 36 Am. JUR. 2D Franchises from Public Entities § 1 (1968 & Supp. 2002)
(pertaining to right-of-way franchises); 62B AM. JUR. 2D Private Franchise Contracts § 2
(1990 & Supp. 2002) (pertaining to business franchises and trademark franchising).
92. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 226.
93. 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000).
94. IND. CODE § 36-1-3-8(a)(4) (2002).
95. City of Gary, 732 N.E.2d at 157-58.
96. Id.
97. 522 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. 1999).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002).
99. 1 F. Supp. 2d 809, 812 (E.D. Tenn. 1998).
100. See 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4237 n.17 (2d ed. 1988).
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jurisdiction."' 01
A further and fundamental objection to Mr. Gillespie's argument on
the enforceability of section 253-and one that is not forum dependent-
is the state-tax savings provision in section 601(c)(2) of the 1996 Act.
102
The anti-preemption language here-"any State or local law pertaining
to taxation"'03-is certainly broader than the language of the Tax Anti-
Injunction Act-"any tax under State law.'
10 4
C. On the Preemptive Effect of Current Federal Statutes
Section 253 should not be interpreted as an attempt by Congress to
impair municipal rights under state law. A proper construction of section
253 would avoid any implication of a taking by Congress. The Supreme
Court in City of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co.'°5 said that
municipal property could not be taken under federal regulatory
authority.'0 6 The accuracy of Mr. Gillespie's inference that the decision
is no longer good law'0 7 is put in doubt by the Supreme Court's more
recent holding that municipal property is protected by the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause no less than privately owned property. 0 8 In
section 253 Congress did not use sufficiently clear language to overcome
a presumption against such a construction. 109 Moreover, had Congress
intended such a result, the bill would have been subject to a point of
order under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.'o
101. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 230.
102. This section provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(c) Federal, State, and local law.-
(2) State tax savings provision.-Notwithstanding paragraph (1), nothing
in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to
modify, impair, or supersede, or authorize the modification, impairment, or
supersession of, any State or local law pertaining to taxation, except as
provided in sections 622 and 653(c) of the Communications Act of 1934
[sections 542 and 573(c) of this title],and section 602 of this Act [set out as
a note under this section].
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(c)(2), 110 Stat. 56, 143.
103. Id.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002).
105. 148 U.S. 92 (1893), reh'g denied, 149 U.S. 465 (1893).
106. Id. at 100-01.
107. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 251.
108. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984).
109. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 471 (1996) ("[T]he historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by [federal regulation] unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.") (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952) ("The exercise of federal
supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."), overruled on other grounds by Lee v. Florida,
392 U.S. 378 (1968).
110. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48
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Congressman Stupak was standing by to make such an objection, had the
House of Representatives veered in that direction."l'
Mr. Gillespie's premise under Part III.A-that any municipal
requirement that a carrier have a franchise before entering the public
rights-of-way "is itself a prohibition that clearly triggers section
253(a)"' l-is not supported by judicial authority. As Mr. Gillespie
notes in a later footnote, 1 3 that argument was made to the Sixth Circuit
by T.C.G. Detroit in T C. G. Detroit v. City of Dearborn114 and rejected as
"sophistry."1 5 His quotation of language 1 6 from the revised opinion for
the panel in City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp. 1 7 to the effect that the
municipality's ability to revoke a wireline franchise and to remove the
company's cable as a penalty for violation "triggers subsection (a)" is at
best dictum, since the holding of that case dealt only with wireless
providers."18 The wireline issues had been disposed of earlier under state
law.119
Mr. Gillespie devotes Part III.B of his article to questioning the
legality of gross-receipts-based franchise fees. 2 0  In the most recent
judicial treatment of that issue in T.C.G. New York, Inc. v. City of White
Plains,121 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals devoted a large segment
of its opinion overturning the City's ordinance to the propriety of the
five-percent fee. Concluding that the legality vel non of a gross-receipts-
based fee was "difficult,"' 22 the court elected to decide the case on the
question of alleged discrimination between the incumbent local exchange
carriers (ILECs) and the CLECs.
123
Contrary to Mr. Gillespie's analysis under Part III.C, this is a case
where the debates on the House floor show unambiguously that Congress
wrote subsection (c) in contemplation of gross-receipts-based fees.
124
Congress, of course, had before it the model of section 622 of the Cable
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2002)).
111. 141 CONG. REc. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stupak).
112. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 232.
113. Id. at 232 n.146.
114. 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
115. Id. at 624.
116. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 232 n.146.
117. 260 F.3d 1160 (2001), amending 247 F.3d 966 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1079 (2002).
118. CityofAuburn, 260F.3dat 1176&n.11.
119. Id. at 1167.
120. Gillespie, supra note 1, Part 111.B.
121. 305 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2001),petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Jan.
10, 2003) (No. 02-1062).
122. Id. at 79.
123. Id. at 80-81.
124. See 141 CONG. REc. H8477 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995); see also infra notes 127-29
and accompanying text.
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Act of 1984,125 which Mr. Gillespie discusses under Part III.E, dealing
with limitations imposed by the Cable Act.126 Section 622, as amended
by the 1996 Act, reads, in pertinent part:
(b) For any twelve-month period, the franchise fees paid by a
cable operator with respect to any cable system shall not exceed 5
percent of such cable operator's gross revenues derived in such
period [for the provision of] cable services.
1 27
A version of subsection (c) far more restrictive than that passed by
the Senate had been reported out by the House committee, but the
manager's version was defeated by a roll call vote of 338-86."2' Both the
proponents and opponents of the House committee's version agreed that
the language adopted would permit gross-receipts-based fees even in
excess of those allowed under section 622.129
In the latter part of his discussion, Mr. Gillespie asserts that
"'revenue-based' fees ... are inappropriate" because they are not
proportional to the carriers' uses of the public rights-of-way. 30  His
argument overlooks the fact that gross receipts are a practical proxy for
intensity of use of the public rights-of-way. The business of the
telephone companies is transporting bytes of information, 131 and
charges-to the first approximation, at any rate-tend to increase as
more information is transported. Whether the load is transported in the
rail carrier's own boxcars or in truck trailers piggy-backed on flatcars
does not destroy the proportionality. Mr. Gillespie quotes the
government's amicus brief to the Second Circuit in City of White Plains
as terming the gross-receipts-based fee as "problematic."' 132 But, after
oral argument, the court clerk sent several questions to the FCC, and the
FCC declined in its supplemental brief, filed March 12, 2002, to
elaborate on its earlier brief.133 In the end, the Second Circuit found the
125. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
126. Gillespie, supra note 1, Part III.E.
127. 47 U.S.C. § 542 (2002). Subsection (g)(1) further provides that "the term
'franchise fee' includes any tax, fee, or assessment of any kind imposed by a franchising
authority or other governmental entity on a cable operator or cable subscriber, or both,
solely because of their status as such." Id. § 542(g)(1).
128. 141 CONG. REC. H8477 (daily ed. Aug. 4,1995).
129. Id.
130. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 242.
131. Through a set of interlocking definitions in section 153(43)-(46) of the
Communications Act, as amended in 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 153(43)-(46), it is clear that
essence of telecommunications services is the transport of information "between or
among [geographic] points specified by the user." Id. § 153(43).
132. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 242 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Federal
Communications Commission and United States, T.C.G. N.Y., Inc. v. City of White
Plains, 305 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-7255)).
133. Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Communications Commission and
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FCC's decisions to be "not controlling.' 34 It is certainly unmistakable
from the legislative history that Congress consciously eliminated any
FCC role with respect to such issues.
III. Conclusion
The overarching lesson to be learned from the rising volume of
litigation between wireline companies and municipalities to which Mr.
Gillespie alludes' 35 is that mankind continues to suffer from the common
failing of trying to get something for nothing. Certainly, the recent
financial busts of various "dot-coms" and telephone companies confirm
that greed is still with this society. Carriers never have been immune
from paying one way or another for what economists call the factors of
production used in their businesses for profit.
With respect to the historical survey in Part II of Mr. Gillespie's
article, it is often said that municipalities are creatures of the state. Be
that as it may, their governmental and proprietary roles and rights have
been substantially augmented by the home rule statutes passed in a vast
majority states as the country has become more urbanized.
36
With respect to the preemptive effect of section 253 of the 1996
Act, there is no evidence in its legislative history that Congress intended
the scope of federal preemption to stray beyond limitations on
regulation 137 to takings of municipal property recognized by the Fifth
Amendment and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. It is perhaps
unrealistic to attribute to the legislative process the prescience to
anticipate the trend of judicial decisions from Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 38 to Gregory v. Ashcroft,139 to United
States v. Lopez, 40 but the text of section 253 permits, if not intends, a
reading that avoids these profound constitutional and political issues.
United States, City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67 (No. 01-7255).
134. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d at 76.
135. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 212.
136. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
137. In section 253(a), Congress may properly be assumed to have focused on
statutes, regulations, and legal requirements, as distinguished from property rights, and
subsection (c) is, as Mr. Gillespie seems to argue under Part III.A, only a "safe harbor"
and not a substantive limitation on them. Gillespie, supra note 1, at 231-35.
138. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
139. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
140. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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